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Abstract 
This paper aims to provide a deeper understanding of the relationship between accounting 
conservatism and the cost of equity capital (COEC). For this purpose, we use the quantile 
regression (QR) framework and examine the effect of two dimensions of conservatism (ex ante 
and ex post) on the COEC. This methodological contribution allows us to test whether the effect 
of the two forms of conservatism vary across the full distribution, especially at the extreme 
quantiles of the COEC. Empirical results from the QR reveal that the effect of the two 
dimensions of conservatism considerably differs across COEC quantiles.  
 
Keywords: Accounting conservatism cost of equity capital, ex ante conservatism, ex post 
conservatism, quantile regression, MENA countries. 
 
Paper type: Research Paper 
I. Introduction 
We intend to provide a deeper understanding of the relationship between accounting 
conservatism and the cost of equity capital. For this purpose, we use the quantile regression 
approach as introduced by Koenker and Basset (1978) and examine how the two forms of 
accounting conservatism (ex ante and ex post) affect the variation of the full cost of equity 
capital distribution, especially at its extreme quantiles. 
A number of studies have examined the effect accounting conservatism on the cost of equity 
capital. However, evidence of such effects, as reported in these studies, is mixed and 
inconclusive. For example, Francis et al. (2004) report no significant association, Chan et al. 
(2009) and Biddle et al. (2012) show a positive association, however, Artiach and Clarkson 
(2014) Garcia et al. (2011), Khalifa and Ben Othman (2015) and Li (2014) find a negative effect 
of accounting conservatism on the cost of equity capital. The apparent inconsistency of the 
findings may be ascribed to the regression approach employed to test such association (Rush et 
al. (2014)). Indeed, a common feature of all previous studies that have sought empirical 
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evidence on the association between accounting conservatism and the cost of equity capital, is 
that they restricted the analysis to the use of the classical ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression. 
OLS regression revolves around estimating a linear relationship between exogenous variables 
or covariates X, and the conditional mean of an endogenous or target variable, Y. It assumes 
that the association between the covariates and the target is constant at each point of the 
distribution of the response variable. If the distribution of the COEC is heterogeneous or if the 
factors that affect the firms’ COEC change their effect from firms with higher COEC to firms 
with lower COEC, the OLS regression tends to throw away valuable information, as it focuses 
only on the mean distribution of the COEC without taking into account the entire distribution. 
In contrast to this, the present study intends to provide a complete description of the COEC’s 
distribution conditioned on accounting conservatism.  
For this purpose, our study suggests to use the quantile regression (QR) approach initially 
introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978) and examine the effect of two dimensions of 
accounting conservatism (ex ante and ex post) on the COEC. QR framework has been 
successfully employed in a variety range of areas of economics and finance to deal with the 
case where the conditional distribution of the target variable varies considerably with the 
exogenous variables (for more details, see for example Koenker and Hallock (2001)).  
So, our paper contributes to the existing literature by providing a novel approach based on a 
QR framework to examine whether or not the effect of ex ante and ex post conservatism have 
inconsistent effects across the whole spectrum of the COEC variable. Generally speaking, QR 
approach was proved to be more robust than OLS regression (Koenker et al. (2012)) not only 
when we focus on the association between covariant and target variables at each quantile of the 
analyzed distribution but also when the target variable shows a major skewness. Our approach 
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is therefore able to produce a robust and complete picture of the distribution of the COEC 
conditioned on the two forms of accounting conservatism (ex ante and ex post). To the best of 
our knowledge, there has not been a study yet that has examined the association between 
accounting conservatism and the COEC using the QR approach especially in emerging 
countries. This paper therefore bridges this gap in accounting literature, especially, using data 
from MENA emerging countries; we provide further empirical evidence on the impact ofex 
ante and ex post conservatism on the COEC by allowing estimates to vary across COEC 
quantiles. We expect that the effect of ex ante and ex post conservatism on the COEC will differ 
considerably across a range of COEC quantiles. We also differ from previous studies by 
examining how the effect of ex post conservatism on the COEC can be affected by the ex ante 
dimension of conservatism. Indeed, we proceed on the Beaver and Ryan’s (2005) assumption 
that ex ante conservatism preempts ex post conservatism and so affect the asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings. 
We are motivated to focus on MENA countries for a number of reasons. First all previous 
studies on such association use data from developed countries (except Khalifa and Ben Othman, 
2014). Second, MENA countries have embarked on an economic and social transition process 
since 1980s in order to comply with the requirement of international monetary funds (Ben 
Othman and Zeghal, 2010). To achieve this aim, MENA countries need to bring foreign capital 
as far as it is necessary for the development of their financial markets. Foreign investors will 
therefore be concerned withthe rate of return (Firm’s COEC) that receives in exchange for their 
investments. Moreover, firms in MENA countries are recognized as applying accounting 
conservatism practices (Khalifa and Ben Othman, (2015) and Khalifa et al., (2016)). Therefore, 
MENA emerging countries is an interesting context for examining the association between 
accounting conservatism and the cost of equity. 
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Our empirical findings are based on a sample of firms pertaining to 13 countries from the 
MENA region (i.e. Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) for the sample period  2004- 2009. As a first test, 
we examine the effect of ex ante and ex post conservatism on the COEC using classical OLS 
regression. Different statistical procedures that rely on OLS regression have been used, 
including: pooled OLS regression and panel data regression with fixed and random effects 
models.  The findings suggest that, as predicted, the ex ante conservatism is positively 
associated with the COEC and that ex post conservatism is negatively associated with the 
COEC. The results are robust to the use of other estimation methods; however, fixed effect 
model provides a higher explanatory power of total variability compared to the other methods. 
Our second examination consists in testing the assumption whether ex ante conservatism may 
affect the association between ex post conservatism and the COEC. To do so, we estimate the 
model describing the association between ex post conservatism and the COEC conditioning on 
the ex ante conservatism. Unlike our prediction, we find that the effect of ex post conservatism 
on the COEC remain unchanged even after introducing ex ante conservatism. Our third test re-
examine the association between the two dimensions of accounting conservatism and the cost 
of equity capital by allowing estimates to vary across COEC quantiles. The results using the 
QR approach seem to be interesting, as there is a significant change at the value of the 
coefficient for ex ante and ex post conservatism in different quantiles compared to the OLS 
results.  In particular, we report that for firms with higher COEC the effect of ex ante and ex 
post conservatism is more pronounced than firms with lower COEC. Moreover, we find that, 
not only the effect of ex post conservatism on the COEC remains negative even after controlling 
for ex ante conservatism, but also it increases in value. Likewise, the result of the QR suggests 
that ex post conservatism has more pronounced intensity for firms with higher COEC. This 
means that firms with high COEC must use the two forms of accounting conservatism. This 
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paper, by using QR approach, sheds more lights on the association between accounting 
conservatism and the COEC and gives new directions for further research in accounting 
literature.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 reviews the literature and develops the 
hypotheses. Section 3 presents the quantile regression approach. Section 4 describes the sample, 
the variables, and econometric models. Results are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
II. Literature review and hypotheses development 
A. Literature review 
Recently, a great debate has opened about the impact of accounting conservatism on 
information risk in equity markets. Opponents of conservatism, like Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) and International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) argue that accounting 
conservatism may have negative effects on equity markets; however proponents consider that 
the effects are positive. Within this framework, a range of empirical studies start the 
examination of the economic consequences of accounting conservatism, especially in equity 
markets (For example, see Rush and Taylor (2015) for a survey of these studies). In particular, 
one line of this research avenue focuses on studying the impact of accounting conservatism on 
the COEC.  
Francis et al. (2004) study the relationship between earnings quality, as measured by seven 
attributes including conservatism, and the COEC. They study US firms over the period  1975- 
2001. They expect that firms with higher degrees of conservatism as a measure of higher 
earnings quality support lower COEC. Using the Basu’s (1997) model to measure conservatism 
and the Brav et al (2004) method to estimate the COEC, they find no significant association 
between accounting conservatism and the COEC.  
Chan et al. (2009) investigate the economic consequences of two dimensions of accounting 
conservatism: ex ante conservatism and ex post conservatism. They argue that conservative 
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accounting plays a signal role by disclosing information about the quality of accounting 
numbers.  They expect that the two dimensions convey different information to equity markets. 
Using a sample of UK non-financial firms observed over the period 1987-1999, they find that 
ex post conservatism is associated with lower quality of financial information and higher COEC 
and that ex ante conservatism is associated with higher quality of financial information and 
lower COEC. 
Garcia et al. (2011) test the relationship between conditional conservatism (ex post) and the 
COEC. Based on a sample of US firms over the period 1975-2003 and using a novel proxy of 
ex post conservatism introduced by Callen et al. (2010), they find that ex post conservatism 
negatively affect the COEC as measured by excess average stock return. Their evidence is 
supported by additional tests, including the employment of other measures of the COEC. 
Buidle et al. (2012) study the effect of ex post conservatism on the COEC for US public firms 
over the period 1986-2008.  They document a positive association between ex post 
conservatism and the COEC. They argue that ex post conservatism leads to information 
asymmetry, fundamental downside risk and therefore increases firm’s COEC. 
Artiach and Clarkson (2014) also study the relationship between accounting conservatism and 
the COEC. They expect that ex post conservatism is inversely related to the COEC. Based on 
a sample of US listed companies over the period 1985-2000, they find, as expected, a negative 
relation between conservatism and the COEC. Moreover, they report that this association 
diminishes for firms with low information asymmetry. 
Li (2015) examines the governance and contracting role of ex post conservatism in reducing 
the COEC and the cost of debt in an international setting. He finds that firms that pertain to 
countries with higher degrees of conservatism have lower COEC and lower cost of debt. He 
also finds that the negative association between conservatism and the COEC “is stronger in 
countries with stronger rule of law and the negative association between conditional 
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conservatism and the cost of debt is stronger in countries with stronger creditor rights” (p. 
556). 
More recently, Khalifa and Ben Othman (2015) examine the effect of ex post conservatism on 
the COEC using data collected from firms in MENA emerging countries for the period of 2004-
2007. They argue that overall conservative accounting enhances the quality of accounting 
information and therefore reduce the COEC. Using the Estrada (2000, 2001, 2004, and 2007) 
approach to measure the COEC and Khan and Watts (2009) method to derive ex post 
conservatism at firm level, they find as expected that ex post conservatism reduce the cost of 
equity capital. 
 
B. Hypotheses development 
This paper aims at examining the association between the two forms of accounting 
conservatism (ex ante and ex post) and the cost of equity capital.  Ex post conservatism or 
commonly called conditional conservatism is defined as an accounting system that requires 
stronger verification to recognize profits versus losses (Basu, (1997); Watts, (2003a)). Under 
this specification, economic losses are recognized in earnings faster than economic gains. The 
second form of accounting conservatism is ex ante or unconditional conservatism is referred to 
the understatement of the book value of net assets relative to their market value (Beaver and 
Ryan, (2005)). Prior analytical studies establishes that accounting conservatism, in particular 
ex post conservatism, improves considerably the functioning of equity markets through 
providing valuable accounting information to market operators (Gietzman and Trombetta, 
(2003), Guay and Verrechia, (2007)), Suijs, (2008)). To better understand this mechanism, we 
review three papers that model the link between ex post conservatism and the cost of equity 
capital. Specially, they argue that ex post conservatism is linked to the cost of equity capital 
through informational channel. For example, Gietzmann and Trombetta (2003) articulate that 
ex post conservatism acts as substitute of voluntary disclosure which is empirically recognized 
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to reduce the cost of equity capital by decreasing investors’ information risk (Diamond and 
Verrecchia, (1981); Botosan and Plumlee, (2002); Easly and O’Hara, (2004); Hail and Leuz, 
(2007); Lambert et al., (2011)). In the same avenue, Bagnoli and Watts (2005) establish through 
a signaling framework that the manager’s declaration that financial reports are conservative 
allows investors in the presence of information asymmetry to infer hidden information about 
actual and future prospects of the firms. In turn, with more information acquired, investors are 
more able to assess the firm value and therefore support less estimation risk, thereby the 
required return rate (cost of equity capital) decreases. From another point of view, Guay and 
Verrecchia (2007) demonstrate that by imposing stronger verification to recognize positive 
economic events than negative economic events, the use ex post conservatism encourages 
managers to adopt a strategic behaviour by fully disclosed accounting information which in 
turn  lead to the reduction of the market discount. Guay and Verrecchia (2007) argue that this 
is achieved because ex post conservative improve contracting efficiency and reduces agency 
and litigation costs. These results coincide with the work by Lambert et al. (2007, 2011) who 
demonstrate that increase the amount of information disclosed to the market improve the 
precision with which market actors can estimate future earnings and therefore reduce the cost 
of equity capital as investors  lowered the required rate of return.  Overall ex post conservatism 
benefits to capital markets by enhancing information quality, decreasing in turn investors’ 
estimation risk which would lead into a significant reduction of the cost of equity capital. 
Therefore, our first hypothesis states: 
 
H1: Ex post conservatism is expected to reduce the cost of equity capital. 
 
While the literature offers a set of studies that provide insight into the implication of ex post 
conservatism in capital markets, there is a limited number of papers that empirically address 
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the economic consequences ofex ante conservatism (Beaver and Ryan, 2005). Nevertheless, 
recent studies by Pae et al. (2004), Roychowdhury and Watts (2004), Givoly et al. (2007)and 
Khan and Watts (2009) established that ex ante conservatism as measured by the market-to-
book ratio is negatively associated with ex post conservatism. Moreover, Chan et al. (2009) 
argue that ex post and ex ante conservatism convey different information about the quality of 
future earnings into capital markets. Based on the above, our second hypothesis is that: 
 
H2: Ex ante conservatism is expected to increase the cost of equity capital. 
Beaver and Ryan (2005) show that ex ante conservatism can prevent ex post conservatism and 
hence affects the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. In fact, they hypothesize that ex ante 
conservatism yields to an increase in the part of intangible assets whose costs are immediately 
recorded or yields unrecorded goodwill such as accelerated depreciation which all of them are 
subject of ex post conservatism. Hence, our third hypothesis is that: 
 
H3: The effect of ex post conservatism on the cost of equity capital is moderated by ex ante 
conservatism. 
 
III. Quantile regression approach 
 
The classical linear model represents a response variable, commonly called dependent variable 
or response variable, Y, as a linear function of one or a set ofindependent variables or 
covariatesX. It uses the ordinary least square (OLS) approach to estimate the parameters in the 
linear model. OLS regression is based on the mean of the conditional distribution of Y, that is 
𝐸(𝒀|𝑿) = 𝑿′?̂?. Formally, let (𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝑥𝑖,𝑡); 𝑖 = 1,2, … … , 𝑁 and  𝑡 = 1,2, … … , 𝑇 be a sample 
population, where subscript i denotes the ith firm and t represents the tthperiod. The target, 𝑦𝑖𝑡, 
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designate the firm’s cost of equity capital, and 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is (𝐾 × 1) vector of independent variables. 
The linear relationship between 𝑦𝑖𝑡 and 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is expressed as follows: 
 
𝒚𝒊𝒕 = 𝒙𝒊𝒕
′ .β + 𝜺𝒊𝒕(1) 
Where, β (𝐾 × 1 vector) are unknown parameters to be estimated.   
In the OLS method, the parameter estimates are found by minimizing the sum of the squared 
errors i.e.: 
𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∑(𝜀𝑖𝑡)
2
𝑖
= ∑(𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ . 𝛽)2
𝑖
            (2) 
Or one could obtain the estimator vector of βaccording to the following minimization problem: 
𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∑ |𝜀𝑖𝑡|
𝑖
= ∑ |𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ . 𝛽|
𝑖
          (3)  
Equation (3) gives parameter estimates by minimizing the sum of absolute errors, commonly 
known as the least absolute deviation (LAD) regression or median regression. 
OLS and LAD methods may suffer from a set of limitations which could affect the quality of 
the estimates. First, OLS or LAD produces estimators that are optimal if errors are iid and 
follow a normal distribution. However, these assumptions may not hold, especially where the 
population is heterogeneous. In such case, the mean distribution of Y is commonly affected by 
extreme values. Therefore, it is more appropriate to use non-mean-based models. 
Second, OLS and LAD methods provide only one estimate based on the central distribution of 
the dependent variable. This provides only a partial view of the relationship between the 
response variables and the covariates. In other words, neither the OLS nor the LAD methods 
take into account the full spectrum of the dependent variable (cost of equity capital) especially 
in the tail regions. To handle these two issues, other regression models have emerged and one 
of them is the quantile regression approach.  
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The quantile regression, initially introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978), constitutes an 
extension of classical least squares estimation of conditional mean models to the estimation of 
an ensemble of models for conditional quantile functions. Quantiles describe a various 
subdivisions of a frequency distribution into equal intervals based on the value of the data. 
Quantile regression is more robust to non-normal errors and outliers. It also gives a larger 
characterization of the data, allowing us to consider the effect of the exogenous variables on 
the entire distribution of the endogenous variable, not merely its conditional mean. 
Furthermore, quantile regression does not need strict assumptions as for classical linear 
regression like to normality, homoscedasicity or absence of outliers (Johnston and DiNardo, 
1997).  
Formally, following Koenker and Basset (1978), and assume that the 𝜃𝑡ℎ quantile of the 
conditional distribution of the dependent variable𝑦𝑖𝑡, is linear in𝑥𝑖𝑡, therefore the conditional 
quantile regression model can be expressed as follows: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ . 𝛽𝜃 + 𝜀𝜃𝑖𝑡 
𝑄𝜃(𝑦𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖𝑡) ≡ inf{𝑦: 𝐹𝑖𝑡(𝑦𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖𝑡)𝜃} = 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ . 𝛽𝜃  (4) 
𝑄𝜃(𝑦𝑖𝑡|𝜀𝜃𝑖𝑡) = 0 
Where 𝑄𝜃(𝑦𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖𝑡)  represents the 𝜃
𝑡ℎ conditional quantile of 𝑦𝑖𝑡 on the (𝐾 × 1) vector of 
independent variables𝑥𝑖𝑡.𝛽𝜃is the unknown vector of parameters to be estimated for different 
values of 𝜃 in [0,1]; and 𝜀𝜃𝑖𝑡 is the error term. The value 𝐹𝑖𝑡(. |𝑥𝑖𝑡) denotes the conditional 
distribution of the target variable conditional on  𝑥𝑖𝑡. For different value of 𝜃 in [0,1], the 
quantile regression method permits to visit the entire distribution of 𝑦 conditional on 𝑥. The 
estimator for 𝛽𝜃 is obtained through the following minimization problem: 
 
𝑀𝑖𝑛 ∑ 𝜃 × |𝜀𝜃𝑖𝑡| + ∑ (1 − 𝜃) × |𝜀𝜃𝑖𝑡|
𝑖𝑡:𝜀𝜃𝑖𝑡<0𝑖𝑡:𝜀𝜃𝑖𝑡>0
= 
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∑ 𝜃 × |𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ . 𝛽| + ∑ (1 − 𝜃) × |𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ . 𝛽|
𝑖𝑡:𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ .𝛽<0𝑖𝑡:𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ .𝛽>0
           (5) 
The optimization problem in equation (5) allows us to obtain the 𝜃𝑡ℎ quantile regression 
estimator ?̂?𝜃 by minimizing the absolute value of a weighted sum of the residuals between 
observed values 𝑦𝑖𝑡 and fitted values𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ . 𝛽. A weight of 𝜃 is attributed to observations with 
negative residuals (the first term in equation (5)) and a weight of (1-𝜃) to observations with 
positive residuals (the second term in equation (5)). Comparing equation (5) with equation (2) 
and (3) reveals one of the important features of the quantile regression that is the estimate values 
of 𝛽𝜃 are not constant but vary across different values of𝜃. One could use this feature to view 
how the effect of the independent variables switches across the cost of equity capital quantiles 
region. It should also be noted that the LAD method is a special case of the quantile regression 
with𝜃 = 0.5. It should be noted that the quantile regression method produces estimation based 
on the weighted sum of residuals for the entire sample and not for a portion of the sample at 
that quantile. The equation (5) do not have a simple form, the minimization can be solved using 
a linear programming techniques (Hao and Naiman, (2007)). 
The quantile regression approach has been widely used in economic literature, financial 
research, corporate governance and other fields outside management sciences. For example 
Arias et al. (2001), Buchinsky (1994 and 2001) and Eide and Mark (1998) in  education 
economics, Chernozhukov and Umantsev (2001) and Engle and Manganelli (2004) in Value at 
Risk, Barnes and Highes (2002) in cross-section of stock market return, Basset and Chen (2001) 
in mutual fund investment styles, Meligkotsidou and Vrontos (2009) in hedge fund strategies, 
Li and Miu (2010) in bankruptcy prediction, Barreto and Hughes (2004) in economic growth 
studies, Li and Hwang (2011) in accounting earnings, Ramdani and Witteloostuijn (2010) in 
corporate governance,  Buchinsky (1994), Garcia et al. (2001), Machado and Mata (2001) and 
Nielsen and Rosholm (2001) in wage analysis. The present study represents the first study that 
14 
 
applies the quantile regression in accounting conservatism and the quality of financial reporting 
literature. 
IV. Research design 
A. Data and sample selection 
Data is collected from companies followed by S&P and included in their S&P/IFC emerging 
markets indices. While the FTSE institutional shareholder services (ISS) and CLSA focus on, 
respectively, developed markets and Asian emerging markets, S&P covers many more 
countries including MENA emerging markets (Ben Othman and Zeghal, 2010). In our sample, 
all MENA companies must be domiciled in an emerging market (S&P/IFCG) or a lesser 
developed global frontier market (S&P/IFCG frontier) and be among the most actively traded 
securities in the market.  
The preliminary sample includes all firms from 13 MENA countries (Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Tunisia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the 
UAE) during the period from 2004 to 2009. This provides an initial sample of 8,700 firm-year 
observations. After eliminating missing data, the set of data contains 3,278 firm-year 
observations. Table 1 presents this sample selection by year and by country.  
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
B. Conservatism and cost of equity capital measures 
B.1 Firm-specific proxy of ex post and ex ante conservatism 
In the present study, we use the Khan and Watts’s (2009) method to estimate the value of ex 
post conservatism at firm level. The choice of such method is mainly motivated by the fact that 
it uses a well-known and widely used model proposed byBasu (1997) to assess ex post 
conservatism. The Basu’s (1997) model is given according the following model: 
𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                (6) 
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Where, NI is net income before extraordinary items, deflated by the market value of equity at 
the beginning of the period. RT is annual return calculated by cumulating monthly returns 
starting from the fourth month after the firm’s fiscal year.  D is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
RT is negative (bad news) and 0 if RT is positive (good news). Under model (6),  𝛽1 relates the 
degree to which new good news was impounded in accounting earnings. Similarly, the degree 
to which bad news was incorporated in earnings is measured by 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 where 𝛽2 is the 
incremental sensibility of earnings to bad news, and hence represents a measure of the 
asymmetric timeliness extent (ex post conservatism).  
To obtain an ex post conservatism at firm level, Khan and Watts (2009) modify the model in 
equation (6) by writing 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 as linear functions of firm-specific as follows: 
𝛽1 = 𝐺 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝜇0 + 𝜇1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝜇2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖 + 𝜇3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖                (7) 
 
𝛽2 = 𝐶 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝜆0 + 𝜆1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝜆2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖 + 𝜆3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖                  (8) 
Where: 
MTB is the market-to-book ratio calculated as market value of equity divided by book value of 
equity. LEV is leverage defined as long-term and short-term debt deflated by market value of 
equity. SIZE is the natural log of market value of equity. 
Empirical estimators of 𝜇𝑖 and  𝜆𝑖 (i=0,…,4) are constant across firms but vary over time. C-
score and G-score vary across firms through cross-sectional variation in the firm-year 
characteristics (SIZE, LEV and MTB). To estimate the coefficient within equation (7) and (8), 
Khan and Watts (2009) use the following annual cross-section regression model: 
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𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖 + 𝑅𝑖(𝜇0 + 𝜇1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝜇2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖 + 𝜇3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖) + 𝐷𝑖
∗ 𝑅𝑖(𝜆0 + 𝜆1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝜆2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖 + 𝜆3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖) + (𝛿1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛿2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖 + 𝛿3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖
+ 𝛿4𝐷𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛿5𝐷𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖 + 𝛿6𝐷𝑖 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖 
This equation results from substitution of equation (7) and (8) into equation (6) including 
additional terms in the last parentheses. After estimating this model, the C-score for each firm 
at each year is obtained as:  
𝐶𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝐶_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 = ?̂?0 + ?̂?1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + ?̂?2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖 + ?̂?3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖 
With regards to ex ante conservatism, Beaver and Ryan (2005) and Chan et al. (2009) propose 
to use the Book-to-Market ratio, computed as the ratio of book to market value of equity. 
Theretofore, ex ante conservatism is measured by: 
𝑈𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 = 𝐵𝑇𝑀 =
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
B.2. Cost of equity capital proxy 
Traditionally the cost of equity capital is estimated through the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM) introduced by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). This method is widely used in the 
context of developed countries, but it is criticized when applied in an emerging markets 
framework. Harvey (1995) and Estrada (2000) argue that the problem behind the use of CAPM 
model arises when estimating systematic risk or market risk. The Classical CAPM supposes 
that markets are totally efficient to use beta risk in estimating cost of equity capital. However, 
emerging markets do not have this characteristic. They are considered as partial integrated 
markets. To estimate the cost of equity for companies in emerging markets, Estrada (2000, 
2001, 2004, and 2007) proposes a new method based on the downside risk approach. Especially, 
the model is as follows: 
𝐶𝑂𝐸𝐶𝑖 = 𝑅𝑓𝑈𝑆 +  𝑅𝑚𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑃𝑊 
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Where COC is the cost of equity of the firm i, 𝑅𝑓𝑈𝑆 is free risk rate of global market (US 
market), 𝑅𝑚𝑖is the risk measure of firm i and 𝑅𝑃𝑊is the premium risk of the global market. 
The risk measure proposed by Estrada (2000) is given by: 
Rm𝑖  =
Σ𝜇𝑖
Σ𝑊
 
Where : 
Σ𝜇𝑖 = √
1
𝑇
∑(𝑅𝑖 − ?̅?)2 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑖 < ?̅? 
And  
Σ𝑊 = √
1
𝑇
∑(𝑅𝑀 − ?̅?𝑀)2 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑀 < ?̅?𝑀 
Σ𝜇𝑖and Σ𝑊 designate respectively  the value of  downside risk of firm i and the global market. 
Where R is the monthly return of the firm, ?̅? is the annual average return, 𝑅𝑀 is the market 
return and ?̅?𝑀 is the annual average market return. 
Finally, the cost of equity capital can be obtained following the Estrada approach as: 
𝐶𝑂𝐸𝐶𝑖 = 𝑅𝑓𝑈𝑆 + 
Σ𝜇𝑖
Σ𝑊
∗ (𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝑓𝑈𝑆) 
C. Econometric models 
To test our hypotheses, we use three models. Equation (9) is used to test the association between 
ex post conservatism and the COEC. Equation (10) is estimated to test the effect of ex ante 
conservatism on the cost of equity capital. Equation (11) is used to examine the effect of ex 
ante conservatism on the association between ex post conservatism and the COEC. 
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𝐶𝑂𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗
13
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                (9) 
𝐶𝑂𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑈_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗
13
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                       (10) 
𝐶𝑂𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐶_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑈_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗
13
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡      (11) 
Where COCE is the estimated cost of equity capital of firm i in year t, obtained using Estrarda 
(2000) approach.  C_CONS represents the firm-year proxy of ex post conservatism for firm i 
at year t, obtained following Khan and Watts (2009) method. U_CONS is a measure of ex ante 
conservatism calculated as the book value of equity deflated by the market value of equity. We 
control for factors that may affect the COEC, including risk and country specific effects. For 
risk factors, we include BETA which represents the slope coefficient from the monthly 
regression of the capital asset pricing model using 24-month window, SIZE is measured by the 
natural logarithm of the market value of equity and LEV measured as total debt deflated by 
market value of equity. For country specific effects, we use a dummy variable, Countryj, which 
takes the value of 1 if the observation is from county j, 0 otherwise.  
Both models are first estimated using the OLS regression method under different specification 
including pooled OLS and panel regression (fixed and random effects). As discussed earlier, 
this classical approach may suffer from limitations like a departure from normality or the 
existence of extreme values. Furthermore, OLS and LAD regressions provide only one measure 
of the central distribution tendency of the dependent variable. To handle the drawbacks of the 
OLS and LAD methods, models in equations (9), (10) and (11) are estimated using quantile 
regression.  Confidence intervals for each parameter in models (9), (10) and (11) are also 
reported. Estimation of the matrix of coefficients’ standard error in the quantile regression 
model is made using the bootstrap method.  
19 
 
V. Empirical results 
A. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports the relevant descriptive statistics for the variables used in our econometric 
models. The mean and median values of the dependent variable, COEC, are respectively 0.5823 
(58.23%) and 0.4112 (41.12%) indicating that firms in MENA countries support higher cost of 
equity capital. The mean and median of ex post conservatism, C_CONS, are -0.1026 and -
0.0606, respectively. However the mean (median) of ex ante conservatism, U_CONS, equals 
0.6698 (0.5489) less than one, which indicate that on average in MENA countries, there is an 
understatement of the book value of equity over the market value of equity indicating the 
presence of ex ante conservatism.  As regard the distribution of our variables, data isnormal 
distributed if the value of kurtosis is lower than 3 and the value of skewness is zero. In the case 
where the skewness is equal or close to zero the distribution is said symmetric and if the value 
of kurtosis is less than 3, the tails of the distribution are thin. We can see that the skewness 
value for all variables is not close to zero, except SIZE variable where the skwness is equal to 
0.0661, indicating that the variables have asymmetric distribution. In addition, the kurtosis 
value is greater than 3 for all variables, except again SIZE variable. This indicates the presence 
of observations with extreme values. This means that the distributions of all variables expect 
SIZE variable have not a bell-shaped (Normal distribution). To confirm this result we conduct 
a skewness and kurtosis test for normality (using the ‘sktest’ in STATA’s (version 12.0) 
statistical software). The null hypothesis of the test supposes that data isnormally distributed. 
If the p-value of the test is lower than 0.05, the distribution is said non-normal. The result of 
the test (are not reported here) indicates that all variables (except SIZE) are not normally 
distributed at the 1% level of confidence with two degree of freedom. At all, this findings 
support that quantile regression may be more reasonable to be used instead of the OLS 
regression. 
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(Insert Table 2 about here) 
Table 3 reports a Pearson correlation test for the key variables in our study. As one could expect, 
the cost of equity capital is negatively correlated with ex post conservatism, C_CONS, and 
positively correlated with ex ante conservatism, BTM respectively at 1% and 10 % level.  For 
control variables, as expected, results show that the cost of equity capital is positively correlated 
with SIZE and negatively correlated with LEV and BETA. Another interesting result is the 
correlation between C_CONS and U_CONS, which is negative indicating that ex post and ex 
ante conservatism, are opposite. This result coincides with the findings of Beaver and Ryan 
(2005) and Chan et al (2009) who argue that ex ante conservatism preempts the application of 
ex post conservatism. 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
B. Results of pooled OLS and panel regression 
B.1 Ex post conservatism 
Table 4 shows the results of testing the association between ex post conservatism and the 
COEC. The model in equation (9) was first estimated using pooled OLS regression and as the 
findings may be affected by outliers we also run a robust OLS regression which permits to 
smooth the effect of outliers on the coefficient regression. This allows us to check whether the 
OLS estimations are affected by extreme values. As expected, the C_CONS coefficient presents 
a negative sign and which is significant at the 1% level. This finding is in line with prior 
empirical studies that provide evidence of negative association between ex post conservatism 
and the COEC such as Garcia et al (2011), Artiach and Clarkson (2014) and Khalifa and Ben 
Othman (2014). Our results are also consistent with prior analytical work by Gietzman and 
Trombetta (2003), Bagnoli and Watts (2005) and Guay and Verrecchia (2007) who show that 
ex post conservatism may act as a substitute of voluntary disclosure which in turn reduce the 
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COEC. To check the robustness of our findings, we also perform a panel regression with fixed 
and random effects to control for firm heterogeneity. The results show that, even controlling 
for firm heterogeneity, the coefficient of the C_CONS remains negative and significant at the 
1%. However, the fixed effects (FE) model presents a higher R-squared coefficient of 
determination and a lower BIC and AIC ratios, suggesting that using the fixed effect model to 
estimate the association between ex post conservatism and the COEC is more appropriate than 
pooled OLS. With regards to risk factors, we find, as expected, that COEC is negatively 
associated with SIZE and positively related to BETA. This indicates that larger firms exhibit 
less cost of equity capital and firms with higher risk support more cost of equity capital. 
Unfortunately, unlike our expectation we find that LEV is negatively associated with COEC.  
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
B.2. Ex ante conservatism 
Table 5 reports the result of our attempt to relate ex ante conservatism, U_CONS, to the cost of 
equity capital, COEC. We proceed in same manner as for ex post conservatism that is we report 
the result of four models OLS, OLS robust, FE and RE models. The main result in Table 5 is 
the magnitude and the sign of the coefficient on U_CONS variable. In all models, we find, as 
expected, that ex ante conservatism affects positively the cost of equity and the association is 
significant at 1% level. This result is in line with the assumption that ex-post and ex-ante 
conservatism convey different information to capital markets (Chan et al., (2009)). All models 
are globally significant at 1% level. Nevertheless, we find again that the FE model is superior 
over OLS, OLS robust and RE models. Indeed, the FE presents the higher degree of variability 
explained by the fitted model. The R² is about 27.48%. Moreover, all estimators are significant 
at 1% level in the FE model. The BIC index of FE is lower compared with the other models. 
Concerning control variables, we find as expected that COEC is positively associated with LEV 
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and BETA and negatively related with SIZE which in line with prior studies (Chan et al, (2009); 
Khalifa and Ben Othman, (2015)) 
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
Prior studies establish that ex post and ex ante conservatism are correlated (Pope and Walker, 
(2003); Pae et al., (2005); Beaver and Ryan, (2005); Chan et al, (2009)). They advance that it 
is more appropriate to test the effect of ex post conservatism on the cost of equity capital by 
controlling for ex ante conservatism. Following this idea, we empirically test the association 
between ex post conservatism and the cost of equity capital after controlling for ex ante 
conservatism. Table 6 reports result of such estimation. The findings are consistent with the 
results in Tables 4 and 5, indicating that ex post conservatism affects negatively the cost of 
equity capital even after controlling for ex ante conservatism. Moreover, taking together, the 
results in Table 4 and Table 6 show that the effect of ex post conservatism on the COEC 
increases after controlling for ex ante conservatism. The coefficient on ex post conservatism 
change from -0.712 to -0.8329 suggesting that, in contrast with the expectation of Beaver and 
Ryan (2005), ex ante conservatism does not preempt the ex post conservatism effect.  
(Insert Table 6 about here) 
C. Results of quantile regression 
The main contribution of the present study is to suggest the quantile regression approach as an 
advanced econometric method to handle the drawbacks of the classical OLS regression method. 
As discussed early, descriptive analysis of our data has revealed that the dependent variable, 
COEC, presents a positively skewed distribution and a kurtosis value greater than 3 indicating 
the presence of outliers which may cause the non-normality of the dependent variable and 
therefore violate the normality hypothesis of residuals in OLS regression. This may affect the 
quality of OLS estimators with regard to the bias and the efficiency. In addition, the OLS 
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method produces estimator that only focuses on the central tendency of the COEC distributions. 
Indeed, it does not permit us to differentiate the effect of ex post and ex ante conservatism on 
the cost of equity capital in the tail regions, that is, between firms with higher COEC and firms 
with lower COEC. Therefore, this motivates us to use an alternative approach that is the quantile 
regression in order to allow this kind of analysis. 
C.1 Ex post conservatism and the cost of equity capital 
Table 7 shows the result of the impact of ex post conservatism, C_CONS, on the cost of equity 
capital, COEC, using quantile regression approach. For simplicity of presentation, the intercept 
and control variable estimates are excluded from Table 7. Table 7 shows that the coefficient 
estimate on ex post conservatism variable, C_CONS is negative and significant for all quantiles 
indicating that our estimation result is consistent across quantiles. Besides, we find that, as the 
quantile levels move up, the impact of ex post conservatism on cost of equity capital increase 
monotonically in magnitude from -0.2225 at the 5th quantile to -0.9413 at the 95th quantile, 
indicating that the effect of ex post conservatism is more pronounced for firms with higher cost 
of equity capital. This coincide with theoretical and empirical findings who support the idea 
that ex post conservatism may play a signal role by allowing managers to provide private 
information (Gietzman and Trombetta, 2003; Bagnoli and Watts, 2005; Guay and Verrecchia, 
2007) and improve the quality of information disclosed, which in turn will reduce the cost of 
equity capital. As firms that exhibit higher cost of equity capital is synonym of lower 
information quality and higher information asymmetry, ex post conservatism will have more 
effect on the cost of equity capital. The two columns at the right of Table 7 present F-tests for 
testing the differences between slope coefficients across various quantiles. Especially, we test 
the difference between coefficient estimates at the 𝜃 and ( 1 − 𝜃)quantiles. Standard errors of 
estimators are obtained by running quantile regression using bootstrap method. The test reveals 
that there are significant differences at 1% level between all quantiles except for the 40th 
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quantile versus the 60th quantile and for the 45th quantile versus the 55th quantile. In particular, 
the difference is more pronounced between firms with higher cost of equity capital and firms 
with lower cost of equity capital, that is, the 5th quantile versus the 95th quantile and the 10th 
quantile versus the 90th 
(Insert Table 7 about here) 
To have a better vision of these results, the effect of ex post conservatism on the cost of equity 
capital for all quantiles is summarized in Figure 1. This figure is produced in STATA using the 
command ‘grqreg’ command after using the ‘sqreg’ command. In particular, Figure 1 draws the 
quantile regression estimates of the ex post conservatism variable (solid line) and their 95% 
confidence intervals (in shaded area) together with fixed-effect estimate (dashed line). Figure 
1shows that the quantile regression estimates vary with quantiles and exhibits a symmetrical V-
shape indicating that the effect of ex post conservatism becomes higher moving from lower 
quantile to upper quantile. We remark also that the 95% confidence intervals do not overlap 
with the zero effect line indicating that the coefficient on ex post conservatism is negatively 
significant for all quantiles.  
(Insert Figure 1 about here) 
The estimation result of the relationship involving ex post conservatism with the cost of equity 
for the control variables across different quantiles and their 95% confidence intervals are shown 
in Figure 2. For SIZE variable, the coefficient is negative for all quantiles. It is significant at 
the 5th–40th quantiles and not significant for the other quantiles. The coefficient on BETA is 
negative and not significant for the 5th–40th and for the 90th – 95th quantiles. It is only positively 
significant for the 55th – 70th quantiles. For the coefficient on LEV, the estimates are all 
negatively significant across quantiles. As we move from lower quantiles to upper quantile, the 
effect of LEV is more pronounced.  
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(Insert Figure 1 about here) 
C.2 Ex ante conservatism and the cost of equity capital 
We repeat the above quantile regression analyses to estimate the association between ex ante 
conservatism, U_CONS, and the cost of equity capital, COEC. The results of quantile 
regression estimations are reported in Table8. The 95% confidence intervals together with 
fixed-effect estimates are displayed in Figure 3 for the ex ante conservatism coefficient and in 
Figure 4 for control variables. According to the result given in Table 8, the coefficient on ex 
ante conservatism, U_CONS, is positively significant and vary significantly across different 
quantiles. Unlike ex post conservatism, the quantile regression estimations show that the 
coefficient on U_CONS does not increase monotonically with the quantile level. Indeed, it 
presents two patterns. The coefficient gains in magnitude between the 5th and 65th quantiles but 
its value decrease between the 70th and 95th quantiles. The F-test for equality of slopes across 
quantiles shows that difference is significant for all pairs of quantiles at 1% level. These result 
that the positive association between ex ante conservatism and the cost of equity capital is rather 
heterogeneous across the COEC quantiles. Thus, the OLS estimates cannot trace all the picture 
of the relationship between the cost of equity capital and ex ante conservatism. We see this 
from Figure 3 where the shaded band (95% confidence interval for the quantile regression 
estimates) does not overlap with the horizontal line (the OLS estimate). Note that this result is 
not predictable a priori, only after running the quantile regression analysis. 
Insert Table 8 about here) 
(Insert Figure 3 about here) 
We turn our attention on control variables. Figure 4 reports the estimated coefficients and their 
95% confidence intervals of the OLS (dashed line) and quantile regression (solid line) 
coefficient estimates for SIZE (Fig 4a), BETA (Fig 4b) and LEV (Fig 4c) in model relating ex 
26 
 
ante conservatism, U_CONS, with the cost of equity capital, COEC. Overall, the figures show 
a variation of the coefficients over the quantiles of the COEC. Besides, the 95% confidence 
intervals from quantile regression does not overlap the horizontal line that present the OLS 
estimate, mainly in tail regions. This presents another proof of the OLS’s failure in capturing 
the whole picture of the dependent variable.   
(Insert Figure 4 about here) 
C.3 Effect of ex post conservatism on the COEC controlling for ex ante conservatism 
Table 9 shows the result of the QR on the association between ex post conservatism and the 
COEC after controlling for ex ante conservatism.  The reading of the results shows that for all 
quantiles the coefficient measuring the effect of ex post conservatism on the COEC remains 
negative and significant at the 1% level even after controlling for ex ante conservatism. 
Moreover, the coefficient on ex post conservatism increases in intensity from the 5th quantile to 
the 95th quantile. Combining the results of Tables 7 and 9, we remark that for firms with higher 
COEC, the effect of ex post conservatism on the COEC is more pronounced after controlling 
for ex ante conservatism. This result suggests that firms having greater COEC must use the two 
forms of accounting conservatism to reduce the COEC. 
(Insert Table 9 about here) 
VI. Conclusion 
Previous studies commonly used ordinary least squares (OLS) method to examine the 
relationship between an endogenous variable and a set of covariates. The OLS estimation 
method provides only one set of coefficients which describe the mean effect of the covariates 
on the dependent variable. However, the quantile regression produces different set of 
coefficients where each set outlines the form of the relationship between the dependent variable 
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and the covariates at a specific quantile of the endogenous variable. Therefore, comparing to 
the OLS method, quantile regression provides a complete picture on the association between 
explanatory variables and the dependent variable. The purpose of this study is to re-examine 
the effect of accounting conservatism on the cost of equity capital using an advanced estimation 
method, i.e. the quantile regression, which allow us to investigate whether the sign and the 
significance of the estimated coefficients vary across different quantiles of the cost of equity 
capital. 
Before discussing the quantile regression results, we first replicate the estimations of previous 
studies by estimating the association between the two dimensions of conservatism, i.e ex ante 
and ex post, and the cost of equity capital using OLS and panel regression methods. Relying on 
data from 13 MENA countries and over the period 2004-2009, we find, as predicted, that ex 
post (ex ante) conservatism is negatively (positively) related to the cost of equity capital in all 
econometric specifications. This evidence support theoretical underpinning that ex post  (ex 
ante) conservatism affect negatively (positively) the cost of equity capital by enhancing 
(worsening) information quality. Furthermore, we investigate if ex ante conservatism preempts 
the effect of conditional conservatism. The result shows that either after controlling for ex ante 
conservatism, ex post conservatism affects negatively the cost of equity capital with more 
pronounced magnitude. 
Turning to quantile regression results, we find that the effect of ex post and ex ante conservatism 
vary considerably and significantly across different level of the cost of equity capital. 
Especially, we find that for firms that exhibit a higher cost of equity capital, the ex post (ex 
ante) conservatism effect is more pronounced than for firms with lower cost of equity capital. 
This evidence suggests that the effects of ex ante and ex post conservatism on cost of equity 
capital are heterogeneous across cost of equity capital’s quantiles. The significant heterogeneity 
in the effect of ex ante and ex post conservatism on the cost of equity capital emphasizes the 
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inadequacy of OLS regression which captures only the conditional mean relationship between 
the cost of equity capital and accounting conservatism and the usefulness of the quantile 
regression approach, which provide a more complete picture of the effect of conservatism on 
the cost of equity capital. 
The findings of this paper contribute to the literature on the economic consequence of 
accounting conservatism in several ways. First, in relation to previous studies, we examine the 
effect of two forms of conservatism, i.e. ex ante and ex post conservatism on the cost of equity 
capital. Second, as previous studies reported mixed results, we suggest the use of the quantile 
regression as an advanced estimation method to reconcile conflicting results on the relationship 
between accounting conservatism and the cost of equity capital. This approach allow us to test 
if the effectsof ex post or ex ante conservatism, in term of sign and significance, varies across 
the whole distributionof the cost of equity capital.  
The findings of the present paper give empirical evidenceon the benefits of accounting 
conservatism in capital markets and have several important implications, suggesting that policy 
makers such as standard-setters and regulators have to accept to develop standards that 
reconsider accounting conservatism as a desirable attribute of information quality. 
Despite the importance of our findings, our paper has limitations with regard to the proxies of 
variable of interest. Our results rely on one measure of conservatism and cost of equity capital. 
It will be of importance to check in a future study the robustness of our resultants to the use of 
other proxies. As a second limitation of our analysis, it should be emphasized that we focus on 
a specific period of time (2004-2009) and a sample of firms pertaining to 12 MENA countries. 
Hence our results only reflect this particular period and sample. For a future work, it seems that 
our estimations can be generalized to other emerging countries and beyond this period of time. 
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Table 1: Distribution of firm-year observations over sample period 
        Fiscal year 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total (%) 
Bahrain 4 4 1 4 12 1 26 0.79 
Egypt 9 13 23 23 18 37 123 3.75 
Israel 68 87 105 112 129 132 633 19.31 
Jordan 58 59 80 85 98 106 486 14.83 
Kuwait 26 48 63 74 80 86 377 11.50 
Lebanon 2 2 1 4 2 2 13 0.40 
Morocco 12 27 31 29 22 28 149 4.55 
Oman 31 19 25 37 57 61 230 7.02 
Qatar 11 21 22 30 23 25 132 4.03 
Saudi Arabia 1 4 6 78 37 67 193 5.89 
Tunisia 2 14 16 19 16 18 85 2.59 
Turkey 16 99 114 118 94 155 596 18.18 
UAE 19 32 52 56 44 32 235 7.17 
Total 259 429 539 669 632 750 3278 100.00 
 
 
 
Table 2: descriptive statistics of dependent/independent variables 
 
Variables mean Median 
Std 
Dev. 
Max Min Skewness Kurtosis Q1 Q3 
SIZE 5.5425 5.5752 1.7622 11.7930 0.4824 0.0661 2.8745 4.2891 6.7540 
BETA 0.9202 0.8505 0.7523 5.5457 -0.5070 0.6716 3.7751 0.2630 1.4761 
LEV 0.7113 0.1800 1.4158 13.6790 0.0000 4.4849 28.9989 0.0949 0.7120 
COEC 0.5823 0.4112 0.5749 3.4720 0.0513 1.7728 6.8923 0.1220 0.8490 
U_CONS 0.6698 0.5489 0.5838 7.3617 0.0340 5.1402 45.8644 0.3672 0.8104 
C_CONS -0.1026 -0.0606 0.2288 0.5720 -2.3443 -3.5903 25.7267 -0.1475 -0.0026 
This table shows descriptive statistics for 1.175 firm-year observations during the period ranges from 2004 to 2007.  It reports the 
mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness, kurtosis, first (25%) and third (75%) quartiles. COEC is the cost 
of equity capital estimated using downside risk. C_CONS is a firm-year specific proxy of conditional conservatism obtained following 
Khan and Watts (2009) methodology. U_CONS is a firm year value of unconditional conservatism measured by the book-to-market 
value of equity ratio. BETA is the slope coefficient from the monthly regression of the capital asset pricing model using 24-month 
window.. SIZE is the log of equity market value. LEV is leverage defined as total debt deflated by market value of equity. 
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Table 3: Correlation coefficient of dependent/independent variables 
Variables COEC C_CONS BETA U_CONS SIZE LEV 
COEC 1.000      
 -----      
C_CONS -0.221** 1.000     
 (0.000) -----     
BETA -0.0044 -0.0405 1.000    
 (0.877) (0.154) -----    
U_CONS 0.0535 -0.4502** -0.0209 1.000   
 (0.059) (0.000) (0.463) -----   
SIZE 0.0481 -0.3116** 0.0559* 0.3645** 1.000  
 (0.090) (0.000) (0.048) (0.000) -----  
LEV -0.0468 -0.3814** 0.1755** 0.0079 -0.1002** 1.000 
 (0.108) (0.000) (0.000) (0.786) (0.000) ----- 
Note: The value in the parenthesis denotes p-value. * and **  denote significance at the 1% and 5% 
levels, respectively. 
This table reports Pearson correlation matrix for our variables of interest where COEC is the cost 
of equity capital estimated using downside risk. C_CONS is a firm-year specific proxy of ex post 
conservatism obtained following Khan and Watts (2009) methodology. U_CONS is a firm year 
value of unconditional conservatism measured by the book-to-market value of equity ratio. BETA 
is the slope coefficient from the monthly regression of the capital asset pricing model using 24-
month window. SIZE is the log of equity market value. LEV is leverage defined as total debt 
deflated by market value of equity. 
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Table 4: The relationship between ex post conservatism and the cost of equity capital:  
OLS regression 
Dependent variable: 
COEC 
Pooled OLS regression 
 
Panel regression 
 
OLS 
OLS 
robust 
 
Fixed effect (FE) 
Random Effect 
(RE) 
Constant 
0.623** 
(0.000) 
0.478**  1.338** 0.629** 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
BETA 
0.022 
(0.296) 
0.042*  0.077** 0.025 
(0.014)  (0.006) (0.238) 
SIZE 
-0.017 
(0.077) 
-0.014  -0.121* -0.017 
(0.059)  (0.015) (0.099) 
LEV 
-0.067** -0.039**  -0.343** -0.076** 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
C_CONS 
-0.712** -0.603**  -0.834** -0.707** 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐹/𝜒2 20.91** 24.31**  38.31** 86.59** 
R² (%) 6.67 7.67  19.15 6.62 
BIC 1944.425 1944.425  1161.611 1958.563 
AIC 1919.08 1919.08  1136.266 1923.08 
Note: The value in the parenthesis denotes p-value. ** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 The table reports the results of the multivariate analysis testing the association between ex post conservatism and the cost 
of equity capital controlling for risk factors using OLS, OLS robust, Fixed effect and random effect models. COEC refers 
to the cost of equity capital as measured using Estrada (2000) approach. C_CONS is a firm-year specific proxy of ex post 
conservatism obtained following Khan and Watts (2009) methodology. BETA is the slope coefficient from the monthly 
regression of the capital asset pricing model using 24-month window. SIZE is the log of equity market value. LEV is leverage 
defined as total debt deflated by market value of equity.𝐹tests the joint significance of all independent variables for OLS, 
OLS robust and FE. 𝜒2with k parameters tests the joint significance for RE. R² is the coefficient of determination for OLS, 
OLS robust and FE, and the correlation squared between fitted and observed value of COEC for RE. AIC and BIC are 
Akaike's Information Criterion and Schwarts’s Bayesian Information Criterion, respectively and which are reported for OLS 
and FE. In the case of RE, AIC and BIC are obtained after running the RE model using maximum likelihood method. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
Table 5: the relationship between unconditional conservatism and the cost of equity 
capital: OLS regression 
Dependent variable: 
COEC 
OLS regression 
 
Panel regression 
 
OLS 
OLS 
robust 
 
Fixed effect (FE) 
Random Effect 
(RE) 
Constant 
0.350** 
(0.000) 
0.150**  2.041** 0.350** 
(0.004)  (0.000) (0.000) 
BETA 
0.021 
(0.206) 
0.041*  0.056** 0.021 
(0.015)  (0.001) (0.206) 
SIZE 
 -0.004 
(0.596) 
0.006  -0.314** -0.017 
(0.369)  (0.000) (0.596) 
LEV 
0.013** 0.013**  0.035** 0.013** 
(0.002) (0.003)  (0.000) (0.002) 
U_CONS 
0.257** 0.339**  0.215** 0.257** 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐹/𝜒2 75.02** 113.96**  99.74* 300.09** 
R² (%) 15.22 21.14  27.48 15.22 
BIC 2437.094 2437.094  1679.609 2451.944 
AIC 2409.970 2409.970  1652.486 2413.970 
Note: The value in the parenthesis denotes p-value. ** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 The table reports the results of the multivariate analysis, testing the association between ex post conservatism and the cost 
of equity capital controlling for risk factors using OLS, OLS robust, Fixed effect and random effect models. COEC refers 
to the cost of equity capital as measured using Estrada (2000) approach. U_CONS is a firm-year proxy of unconditional 
conservatism calculated by dividing book value of equity by market value of equity. BETA is the slope coefficient from the 
monthly regression of the capital asset pricing model using 24-month window. SIZE is the log of equity market value. LEV 
is leverage defined as total debt deflated by market value of equity.𝐹tests the joint significance of all independent variables 
for OLS, OLS robust and FE. 𝜒2with k parameters tests the joint significance for RE. R² is the coefficient of determination 
for OLS, OLS robust and FE, and the correlation squared between the fitted and observed value of COEC for RE. AIC and 
BIC are Akaike's Information Criterion and Schwarts’s Bayesian Information Criterion, respectively, and which are reported 
for OLS and FE. In the case of RE, AIC and BIC are obtained after running the RE model using maximum likelihood 
method. 
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Table 6: The association between ex post conservatism and the cost of equity capital after 
controlling for unconditional conservatism 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Constant 0.6149 0.3806 1.62 0.107 -0.1325 1.3624 
BETA 0.0779 0.0278 2.80 0.005 0.0232 0.1327 
SIZE -0.0260 0.0600 -0.43 0.665 -0.1439 0.0918 
LEV -0.3206** 0.0312 -10.27 0.000 -0.3819 -0.2593 
U_CONS 0.2579** 0.0903 2.85 0.004 0.0805 0.4354 
C_CONS -0.8329** 0.0990 -8.41 0.000 -1.0273 -0.6385 
𝐹 32.62**      
R² (%) 20.16      
Note: The value in the parenthesis denotes p-value. ***  denotes significance at 1% . 
 The table reports the results of the multivariate analysis testing the association between conditional conservatism 
and the cost of equity capital controlling for risk factors and unconditional conservatism using Fixed effect model. 
COEC refers to the cost of equity capital as measured using Estrada (2000) approach. C_CONS is a firm-year 
specific proxy of ex post conservatism obtained following Khan and Watts (2009) methodology. U_CONS is a firm-
year proxy of unconditional conservatism calculated by dividing book value of equity by market value of equity. 
BETA is the slope coefficient from the monthly regression of the capital asset pricing model using 24-month 
window. SIZE is the log of equity market value. LEV is leverage defined as total debt deflated by market value of 
equity.𝐹tests the joint significance of all independent variables. R² is the coefficient of determination. 
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Table 7: Impact of ex post conservatism (C_CONS) on the cost of equity capital (COEC) across quantiles. 
 Estimate result of quantile regression   Tests of the equality of slope estimates across 
quantiles 
Quantiles 
Estimate p-value Pseudo R²(%) Quantile Estimate p-value 
Pseudo 
R²/R²(%) 
 Quantile F-statistics p-value 
0.05 -0.2225** (0.000) 2.31 0.95 -0.9413** (0.000) 5.52  0.05 vs. 0.95 4.42* (0.035) 
0.10 -0.3268** (0.000) 3.29 0.90 -0.9621** (0.000) 4.69  0.10 vs. 0.90 10.30** (0.001) 
0.15 -0.3386** (0.000) 4.06 0.85 -0.8306** (0.000) 4.33  0.15 vs. 0.85 8.04** (0.004) 
0.20 -0.4157** (0.000) 4.72 0.80 -0.7548** (0.000) 4.38  0.20 vs. 0.80 4.90* (0.027) 
0.25 -0.4785** (0.000) 5.25 0.75 -0.7461** (0.000) 4.27  0.25 vs. 0.75 3.35 (0.067) 
0.30 -0.4973** (0.000) 5.29 0.70 -0.8412** (0.000) 4.51  0.30 vs. 0.70 6.48* (0.011) 
0.35 -0.5945** (0.000) 4.90 0.65 -0.8601** (0.000) 4.85  0.35 vs. 0.65 5.18* (0.023) 
0.40 -0.7124** (0.000) 4.52 0.60 -0.8237** (0.000) 5.00  0.40 vs. 0.60 1.00 (0.316) 
0.45 -0.7025** (0.000) 4.58 0.55 -0.7595** (0.000) 5.07  0.45 vs. 0.55 0.75 (0.386) 
0.50 (LAD) -0.7179** (0.000) 4.85         
Note: The value in parenthesis denotes the p-value. ** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
The table reports the results of  the multivariate analysis testing the impact of ex post conservatism on the cost of equity capital using quantile regression approach. It adopts a 
multiple regression methodology including the three risk factors (SIZE, BETA and LEV). Since we focus on the association between ex post conservatism and the cost of 
equity capital, we only report the coefficient estimates on C_CONS variable.  
The F-tests for the differences of slope parameters at the θ  and ( 1 − 𝜃)  quantiles are presented in the two right-hand columns of this table. 
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Table 8: Impact of ex ante conservatism (U_CONS) on the cost of equity capital (COEC) across quantiles. 
 Estimate result of quantile regression  Tests of the equality of slope estimates across 
quantiles 
Quantiles Estimate p-value Pseudo 
R²(%) 
Quantile Estimate p-value Pseudo 
R²(%) 
 Quantile F-statistics P-value 
0.05 0.0105 (0.062) 0.3 0.95 0.1970** (0.000) 5.12  0.05 vs. 0.95 11.51** (0.000) 
0.10 0.0261** (0.001) 0.5 0.90 0.2666** (0.000) 8.08  0.10 vs. 0.90 38.00** (0.000) 
0.15 0.0416** (0.001) 0.71 0.85 0.2742** (0.000) 9.15  0.15 vs. 0.85 35.65** (0.000) 
0.20 0.0809** (0.001) 1.25 0.80 0.3145** (0.000) 9.93  0.20 vs. 0.80 30.10** (0.000) 
0.25 0.1541** (0.000) 2.33 0.75 0.3755** (0.000) 10.61  0.25 vs. 0.75 24.54** (0.000) 
0.30 0.1688** (0.000) 3.75 0.70 0.4057** (0.000) 11.45  0.30 vs. 0.70 27.46** (0.000) 
0.35 0.2601** (0.000) 5.97 0.65 0.4212** (0.000) 11.61  0.35 vs. 0.65 18.96** (0.000) 
0.40 0.2915** (0.000) 8.32 0.60 0.4143** (0.000) 11.70  0.40 vs. 0.60 13.27** (0.000) 
0.45 0.3256** (0.000) 10.46 0.55 0.3937** (0.000) 11.77  0.45 vs. 0.55 4.95* (0.026) 
0.50 (LAD) 0.3701** (0.000) 11.46         
Note: The value in parenthesis denotes the p-value. ** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
The table reports the results of  the multivariate analysis testing the impact of ex post conservatism on the cost of equity capital using quantile regression approach. It adopts a multiple 
regression methodology including the three risk factors (SIZE, BETA and LEV). Since we focus on the association between ex ante conservatism and the cost of equity capital, we only 
report the coefficient estimates on U_CONS variable.  
The F-tests for the differences of slope parameters at the θ  and ( 1 −θ)  quantiles are presented in the two right-hand columns of this table. 
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Table 9: Impact of ex post conservatism (C_CONS) on the cost of equity capital (COEC) conditioned by ex ante conservatism using QR 
approach 
 
 Estimate result of quantile regression  Tests of the equality of slope estimates across 
quantiles 
Quantiles Estimate p-value Pseudo 
R²(%) 
Quantile Estimate p-value Pseudo 
R²(%) 
 Quantile F-statistics P-value 
0.05 -0.1597** (0.062) 1.08 0.95 -2.1145** (0.000) 11.21  0.05 vs. 0.95 26.09** (0.000) 
0.10 -0.2749** (0.001) 1.79 0.90 -2.2559** (0.000) 11.98  0.10 vs. 0.90 75.50** (0.000) 
0.15 -0.3677** (0.001) 2.30 0.85 -2.1263** (0.000) 13.46  0.15 vs. 0.85 98.26** (0.000) 
0.20 -0.5273** (0.001) 3.02 0.80 -2.0738** (0.000) 14.65  0.20 vs. 0.80 86.69** (0.000) 
0.25 -0.6944** (0.000) 3.99 0.75 -2.144** (0.000) 15.81  0.25 vs. 0.75 62.37** (0.000) 
0.30 -0.8266** (0.000) 5.13 0.70 -1.9315** (0.000) 16.62  0.30 vs. 0.70 32.60** (0.000) 
0.35 -1.0932** (0.000) 6.55 0.65 -1.9102** (0.000) 17.09  0.35 vs. 0.65 17.44** (0.000) 
0.40 -1.3584** (0.000) 8.36 0.60 -1.8473** (0.000) 16.69  0.40 vs. 0.60 8.02** (0.000) 
0.45 -1.4626** (0.000) 10.28 0.55 -1.9140** (0.000) 15.32  0.45 vs. 0.55 9.64** (0.026) 
0.50 (LAD) -1.7852** (0.000) 12.52         
Note: The value in parenthesis denotes the p-value. ** denotes significance at 1% level. 
The table reports the results of  the multivariate analysis testing the impact of ex post conservatism on the cost of equity capital using quantile regression approach. It adopts a multiple 
regression methodology including the three risk factors (SIZE, BETA and LEV) and controlling for ex ante conservatism. Since we focus on the association between ex ante conservatism 
and the cost of equity capital, we only report the coefficient estimates on C_CONS variable.  
The F-tests for the differences of slope parameters at the 𝜃  and ( 1 − 𝜃)  quantiles are presented in the two right-hand columns of this table. 
43 
 
Figure 1 Impact of ex post conservatism (C_CONS) on the cost of equity capital 
(COEC): Quantile regression estimates with 95% confidence intervals Vs. OLS estimate 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for size (SIZE), beta 
(BETA) and leverage (LEV) in the quantile regressions of ex post conservatism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1
.5
0
-1
.0
0
-0
.5
0
0
.0
0
C
_C
O
N
S
.05 .1 .15 .2 .25 .3 .35 .4 .45 .5 .55 .6 .65 .7 .75 .8 .85 .9 .95
Quantile
-0
.1
5
-0
.1
0
-0
.0
5
0
.0
0
0
.0
5
S
IZ
E
.05.1.15.2.25.3.35.4.45.5.55.6.65.7.75.8.85.9.95
Quantile
Fig.2a
-0
.4
0
-0
.2
0
0
.0
0
0
.2
0
B
E
T
A
.05.1.15.2.25.3.35.4.45.5.55.6.65.7.75.8.85.9.95
Quantile
Fig.2b
-0
.2
0
-0
.1
5
-0
.1
0
-0
.0
5
0
.0
0
L
E
V
.05.1.15.2.25.3.35.4.45.5.55.6.65.7.75.8.85.9.95
Quantile
Fig.2c
44 
 
Figure 3 Impact of ex ante conservatism (U_CONS) on the cost of equity capital 
(COEC): Quantile regression estimates with 95% confidence intervals Vs. OLS estimate 
 
 
Figure 4: Coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for beta (BETA), leverage 
(LEV), and size (SIZE) in the quantile regressions of ex ante conservatism 
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